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Argument 
I. Petitioner's Position Concerning the Property Division Is 
Unsupported By the Law and the Record. 
In the decree of divorce, executed by the trial court, the court expressly 
adopted the stipulation of the parties as to how the Delta Family Care Retirement 
Plan would be divided. (Decree, at fl36, attached as Exhibit B to Respondent's 
Initial Brief.) Petitioner now claims that the only stipulation or agreement was 
with regards to a "T-Mobile" account, as opposed to a retirement account with 
Delta, notwithstanding the express language of the divorce decree. Under 
Petitioner's reasoning because the retirement plan discovered was supposedly 
from another a company, there was no agreement. To the contrary, as Petitioner 
acknowledges in her brief, her counsel expressly said a credit would be given as 
an off-set if any account were found. (Br. of Appellee at 15; R. at 1020.)(ltalics 
added.) The error in Petitioner's reasoning is further reflected in the decree and 
findings of the district court, which both referred to "retirement with Delta Airlines, 
T-Mobile." (Decree, at H36; Findings, at 1J72, attached as Exhibits B and C to 
Respondent's Initial Brief.) Even while attempting to reverse her position on how 
the account should be treated, Petitioner never claimed to the trial court that the 
newly discovered account was anything other than that anticipated by the parties' 
stipulation. Now that the case has reached this Court, Petitioner for the first time 
claims that the account discovered is outside of the scope of the agreement. 
To the contrary, the trial court's original decree and findings were plain in 
outlining and adopting the stipulation regarding the retirement plan. That the 
district court would sign these documents adopting the stipulation after the 
hearing, expressly changing course, is virtually conclusive evidence of the court's 
abuse of discretion. 
II. The District Court's Findings Were Insufficient. 
The district court awarded Respondent only a future occurring Woodward 
share without making adequate factual findings. As outlined in Respondent's 
opening brief, Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), and its 
progeny set forth specific considerations which should be considered by a trial 
court in determining how and when to divide retirement benefits between 
divorcing parties. While Petitioner speculates as to the considerations bearing 
on the trial court's ultimate determination that distribution of the Delta Family 
Care Retirement Plan should be delayed, the trial court took no evidence and 
Petitioner proffered no evidence. There is nothing but unsupported speculation 
by Petitioner's counsel and the trial court about the validity of expert opinion 
proffered by Respondent. 
It is clear that the trial court's on-the-record speculation as to the divisibility 
of the retirement plan, without any evidentiary foundation is insufficient. In 
Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"Failure of the trial court to make findings on all material issues is 
reversible error unless the facts in the record are 'clear, uncontroverted, 
and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment.'... The 
findings of fact must show that the court's judgment or decree 'follows 
logically from, and is supported by, the evidence.' The findings 'should be 
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the 
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached.'" 
id. at 1078, citing, Acton v. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)(lnternal 
citations omitted.) It is clear that the trial court should have set forth in findings of 
fact the factual basis for its conclusion that the Delta Family Care Retirement 
Plan had no present value and could not be divided along with the rest of the 
marital property as the parties had anticipated, had agreed to do, and as the 
district court had done with all of the other retirement accounts. 
In this case, the only evidence that was proffered to the trial court 
established just the opposite, namely that the plan had an ascertainable present 
value. However, the trial court did not take evidence in this regard and made no 
oral or written findings. The Supplemental Decree of Divorce summarily 
concluded, "that the Respondent be awarded his Woodward share of the 
Petitioner's defined benefit pension plan known as the Delta Family-Care 
Retirement Plan through Delta Air Lines, Inc. ..." The trial court abused its 
discretion in refusing to take evidence in this regard, ignoring the only evidence 
proffered in this regard, and granting Respondent only a future Woodward share 
rather than a present share in the plan without any evidentiary support. Indeed, 
in her brief, Petitioner offers no substantive analysis of Woodward and its 
progeny to support a contrary assertion. The decision of the district court should 
be reversed. 
III. Petitioner's Arguments Are Barred By Judicial Estoppel. 
In response to Respondent's contention that Petitioner's change in position 
should be barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel, Petitioner argues that the 
doctrine can not apply, claiming there was no prior judicial proceeding. Under 
Petitioner's reasoning, the trial and each subsequent hearing is all part and 
parcel of the same judicial proceeding. Petitioner cites no authority to support 
this proposition. 
Petitioner's claim is contrary to both caselaw and scholarly commentary on 
the subject. While Respondent's research revealed no Utah caselaw addressing 
this issue, as a general rule: 
The principle, rule, or doctrine of estoppel to assume inconsistent positions 
in legal proceedings applies generally to positions assumed not only in the 
course of the same action or proceeding, but also to proceedings 
supplemental thereto including proceedings for review or re-trial... 
31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 138 (2007). In like manner, the United States Supreme 
Court has stated, "Judicial estoppel 'generally prevents a party from prevailing in 
one phase of a case on an argument and then relying on a contradictory 
argument to prevail in another phase.'" New Hampshire v. Maine. 532 US 742, 
749 (2001), citing, Peqram v. Hedrich, 530 US 211, 227 n.8 (2000). Several 
sister states have come to the same conclusion. See, e.g., Bank of Wichita v. 
Ledford, 151 P.3d 103, 112 (Okla. 2006)(judicial estoppel applies to inconsistent 
positions taken in the course of the same judicial proceeding) Jackson v. County 
of Los Angeles, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 96, 101-02 (Cal. App. 1997)(judicial estoppel 
applies to positions taken "in the same or some earlier proceeding"); Cummings 
v. Bahr, 685 A.2d 60, 66 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1996)0'udicial estoppel is 
"equally applicable where a litigant asserts inconsistent legal positions in different 
proceedings in the same litigation.") 
In this case, Petitioner affirmatively represented to the district court in one 
hearing or proceeding that there was no retirement account in order to obtain a 
benefit for herself and that if one were discovered, Respondent should be 
awarded a credit as an off-set to the property division. Petitioner successfully 
maintained her prior position in that the court issued its oral and written findings, 
awarding Petitioner a large cash property distribution and requiring Respondent 
to refinance his assets to meet his obligation. Respondent relied on the prior 
position by resting with the parties' stipulation and accepting the courts' promised 
off-set or judgment. However, as soon as the evidence was uncovered to prove 
Petitioner's representations false, Petitioner sought to avoid the effect of her prior 
stipulation and representations. Under these circumstances, the elements of 
judicial estoppel are met. Petitioner should be estopped from requesting 
separate treatment for the Delta Family Care Retirement Plan. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth herein and those in Respondent's opening brief, 
the district court abused its discretion in awarding Respondent only a Woodward 
share in the Delta Family Care Retirement Plan and in failing to implement the 
parties' stipulation. The district court further erred in allowing Petitioner to switch 
its position under the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Respondent respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the determination of the district court and 
remand the case with instructions to determine the present cash value of the 
Delta Family Care Retirement Plan and to equitably divide the plan immediately. 
Respondent requests oral arguments. 
DATED this / ^ day of June, 2007. 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
By: £ > ^ & / W ^ v v ^ 
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Benjamin C Rasmussen 
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